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RISK REDUCTION IN OFFICE WORKPLACE
ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN NEWLY-DISABLED
EMPLOYEES AND MANAGEMENT OF
NEW YORK CITY COMPANIES
Marta B. Varela*
INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"),1 enacted by
Congress in 1990 to bring disabled Americans into the mainstream
workplace,2 has become a widely-available tool for individual
workers to receive concessions from management. Many employ-
* Chair and Commissioner of the New York City Commission on Human
Rights. B.A., Harvard-Radcliffe College, 1977; J.D., Fordham University School of
Law, 1985; LL.M., Fordham University School of Law, 1994. The opinions expressed
herein are the sole responsibility of the author, and are not a statement of either
agency or mayoral policy.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
2. See id.
(a) Findings
The Congress finds that -
(1) some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is
growing older;
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious
and pervasive social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such
critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, educa-
tion, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization,
health services, voting, and access to public services;
(4) unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis
of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age, individuals who have
experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have often had no
legal recourse to redress such discrimination;
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion, the discrimina-
tory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers,
overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to ex-
isting facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and
criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activi-
ties, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities;
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that
people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our soci-
ety, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically,
and educationally;
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ers realize that developing workplace policies to reduce the risk of
disability discrimination is more efficient than litigating "undue
hardship" claims in court.3
Disability laws can subject the unwary employer to liability. For
instance, employers that immediately reject requests for accommo-
dations violate disability laws,4 because an employer has an obliga-
tion to consider whether the requested accommodation requested
constitutes an "undue hardship."5 Employers may also subject
themselves to liability by making insufficient descriptions of the es-
sential functions of a job.6 The title of a job can have a counter-
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond
the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic assump-
tions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society;
(8) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are
to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living,
and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination
and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to compete
on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free
society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dol-
lars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and
nonproductivity.
(b) Purpose
It is the purpose of this chapter -
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elim-
ination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards address-
ing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in en-
forcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals
with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in or-
der to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities.
Id.
3. Id. at § 12111(10)(A).
4. See DaSilva v. New York Racing Ass'n, NYCCHR Compl. No. E95-0668,
Rec.Dec. & Order (April 16, 1996), adopted, Dec. & Order (June 25, 1996), affd sub
nor. New York Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. New York City Comm'n on Human Rights,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 10, 1997, at 28 (Sup. Ct., Queens County, Jan. 10, 1997).
5. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1998);
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-101 to 8-131 (1996).
6. As is apparent from the language used in the EEOC's Technical Assistance
Manual, the EEOC takes the position that the authority to determine what are the
"essential functions of a job" is not reserved to the employer:
2.3(a) Identifying the Essential Functions of a Job
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productive impact on an employer's ability to successfully recruit
without liability for discrimination, particularly among employers
whose thin organizational structure requires them to ask employ-
ees to perform several different functions.7 For example, a law
firm who expects the person who answers the phone in the recep-
tion area to also perform a variety of other tasks which require
mobility but advertises the job as for a "receptionist," may find
itself having to explain to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") why an obviously disabled employee (but
one without a speech or hearing-affecting disorder) could not per-
form the essential functions of the job as described.
Employers should also recognize the danger in hiring an em-
ployee with little or no experience over a qualified disabled candi-
date, because such conduct establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination.8 Finally, employers must refrain from making in-
quiries of employees not obviously disabled about the possible
existence of a disability, including requesting pre-hire medical ex-
aminations.9 On the flip side, employers must not breach confiden-
tial information concerning their employee's disabilities and
accommodations.10 The potential liability stemming from such
statements demonstrates the need for experienced human relations
professionals to train supervisors in how to avoid asking potentially
dangerous questions in job interviews.
The unwary employer can easily fall into one of these traps and
face substantial liability. This Article concentrates on the potential
Sometimes it is necessary to identify the essential functions of a job in order
to know whether an individual with a disability is "qualified" to do the job.
The regulations provide guidance on identifying the essential functions of
the job. The first consideration is whether employees in the position are
required to perform the function.
For example: A job announcement or job description for a secretary or re-
ceptionist may state that typing is a function of the job. If, in fact, the em-
ployer has never or seldom required an employee in that position to type,
this could not be considered an essential function.
If a person holding a job does perform a function, the next consideration is
whether removing that function would fundamentally change the job.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MAN-
UAL, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION EEOC-M-1A ch. 2, § 2.3(a), at 11-12 (Jan. 1992)
[hereinafter "TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL"].
7. See Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
8. See Leventhal v. Louis Harris and Assocs., Inc., NYCCHR Compl. No.
10174356-EP, Rec. Dec. & Order (May 23, 1991), adopted as modified, Dec. & Order
(Dec. 10, 1991), affd sub nom. Louis Harris and Assocs., Inc. v. deLeon, 634 N.E.2d
603 (N.Y. 1994).
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
10. See id. § 12112(d)(3)(B).
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pitfalls for employers arising from the ADA protections afforded
to employees with no prior record of disability returning to work
after medical certification of a disability requiring accommodation.
Philosophically, many advocates for the disabled "see little conflict
between demanding that the disabled be treated like everyone else,
while insisting that more physical and mental problems be labeled
disabilities, entitling [more] people to special treatment."'" In
practice, however, employers need to walk a thin line to avoid law-
suits, which suggests how far from the original intent of the ADA
the law has traveled. As the New York City Commission on
Human Rights (the "Commission") enforces both the ADA 2 and
its own law (which contains an even more expansive definition of
disability), a comparison of the levels of risk to employers posed by
the two laws is instructive. The Occupational Health and Safety
Act of 1970 ("OSHA") 3 and Family Medical Leave Act of 1993
(the "FMLA")' 4 regulations complicate factors even, as well as the
increased possibility of rapid transmission of infectious diseases to
the working population due to the increased popularity of air
travel, all making the office workplace a more challenging environ-
ment to manage.
Part I of this Article describes the Federal laws that afford dis-
abled employees protection from unnecessary intrusion into their
private lives and sets out the requirements imposed on employers.
Part II discusses the disability laws of New York City. Lastly, Part
III of this Article demonstrates the applicability of the different
laws to employers in New York City.
I. THE FEDERAL LAWS
A. The ADA
In essence, the ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified
person who has a disability in employment matters solely because
of the person's disability.15 While seemingly simplistic, the ADA is
11. Robert Samuelson, Where Disability Law Can't Reach, N.Y. POST, July 1,
1999, at 31.
12. The New York City Commission on Human Rights has a work-sharing agree-
ment with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which permits it to inves-
tigate ADA complaints with concurrent jurisdiction, i.e., allegations of workplace
discrimination occurring in New York City on the basis of a "disability" as defined by
the ADA.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (1994).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
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filled with intricacies. These specifics are discussed in the separate
subsections below.
1. Perform Essential Functions "With or Without
Reasonable Accommodation"
Under the ADA, an applicant for a particular position, or an
incumbent who has become disabled, must be able to perform the
"essential functions' 1 6 of a job "with or without reasonable accom-
modation."17 Section 2.3(b) of the EEOC's Technical Assistance
Manual18 indicates that determining the essential functions of a job
can be established in a variety of ways, including "an informal anal-
ysis by observing and consulting with people who perform the job
or have previously performed it and [sic] their supervisors. "19
Although a formal job analysis may be conducted, it may prove to
be less helpful in the event of litigation. This is due to the
probability that the attorney for the complainant will counter that
analysis with a competing analysis that introduces evidence that the
essential functions of the job were not what the employer would
have the jury believe. 0
2. Pre and Post-offer Employment Inquiries About a Disability
In most cases, if an applicant or an employee wants to make an
issue of his disabled status, an employer must be prepared to either
accommodate the employee or litigate. Employers must be careful
about the questions they ask job applicants and current employees
and must avoid deliberately or inadvertently revealing confidential
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
(8) Qualified individual with a disability
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires. For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be given to
the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interview-
ing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
essential functions of the job.
Id.; See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (describing "essential functions" as "fundamental
job duties of employment position the individual with the disability holds or desires"
and not "the marginal functions of the position").
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1211(8).
18. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 6, at 11-19 to 21.
19. Id. at 11-20.
20. See, e.g., Ryan v. City of Highland Heights, 1995 WL 584733, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
1995) (stating that the plaintiffs offered a competing analysis of essential functions of
the job).
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information,2 1 because the ADA's rules about preserving employee
confidentiality restrict what an employer can tell other employees
about any connection between a change in the disabled employee's
working conditions and the existence of a disability. 22 In addition,
an employer may not make any pre-employment inquiries about a
disability, or about the nature or severity of a disability on applica-
tion forms, in an interview, or, in background and reference
checks. 23 An employer may not make any medical inquiry or re-
quire a medical examination prior to making a conditional offer of
employment.2 4
An employer may ask a job applicant questions about the appli-
cant's ability to perform specific job functions, tasks, or duties, as
long as these questions are not phrased in terms of a disability. 5
An employer may ask all applicants to describe or demonstrate
how they will perform a job. If an individual has a known disability
that the employer believes might interfere with or prevent per-
formance of job functions, the applicant may be asked to describe
or demonstrate how these functions will be performed. 6 This is
true even if other applicants are not asked to do so.2 1
An employer may condition a job offer on the results of a medi-
cal examination or on the responses to medical inquiries if such an
examination or inquiry is required of all entering employees in the
same job category, regardless of disability. 8 Information obtained
from such inquiries must remain strictly confidential.2 9 A post-of-
fer examination or inquiry has to be "job-related" and "consistent
with business necessity" if the examination or inquiry is conducted
in accordance to the regulations set out in the statute.3 °
An employer may condition a job offer on the satisfactory result
of a post-offer medical examination or medical inquiry if this is re-
quired of all entering employees in the same job category regard-
less of disability.31 Questions may be asked about previous injuries
and workers' compensation claims.32 If, however, an individual is
21. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 6, at V-4 to 16.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(B) (1999).
23. See id. § 12112(d)(2)(A).
24. See id.
25. See id. § 12112(d)(2)(B).
26. See id. § 12112(d)(3).
27. See id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
28. See id. § 12112(d)(3)(A).
29. See id. § 12112(d)(3)(B). There are exceptions to the confidentiality rule.
30. Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (1999).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(B).
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not hired because a post-offer medical examination or inquiry
reveals a disability, the reasons for not hiring must be job-related
and necessary for the business.33 The employer also must show
that no reasonable accommodation was available that would en-
able this individual to perform the essential job functions, or that
accommodation would impose an undue hardship.34
A post-offer medical examination may disqualify an individual
who would pose a "direct threat" to health or safety,35 and such
disqualification must be job-related and consistent with business
necessity. 36 In addition, a post-offer medical examination may not
disqualify an individual with a disability who is currently able to
perform essential job functions because of speculation that the dis-
ability may cause a risk of future injury.37
a. Examples:
An individual who has an abnormal back X-ray may not be
disqualified from a job that requires heavy lifting because of
fear that she will be more likely to injure her back or cause
higher workers' compensation or health insurance costs. How-
ever, where there is documentation that this individual has in-
jured and re-injured her back in similar jobs, and the back
condition has been aggravated further by injury, and if there is
no reasonable accommodation that would eliminate the risk of
reinjury or reduce it to an acceptable level, an employer would
be justified in rejecting her for this position.
If a medical examination reveals that an individual has epi-
lepsy and is seizure-free or has adequate warning of a seizure, it
would be unlawful to disqualify this person from a job operating
a machine because of fear or speculation that he might pose a
risk to himself or others. But if the examination and other med-
ical inquiries reveal that an individual with epilepsy has seizures
resulting in loss of consciousness, there could be evidence of sig-
nificant risk in employing this person as a machine operator.
However, even where the person might endanger himself by op-
erating a machine, an accommodation, such as placing a shield
over the machine to protect him, should be considered.
33. See id. § 12112(d); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.14(b)(3), 1630.15(b)(1).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) ("The term 'direct threat' means a significant risk to
the health or safety of others that can not be eliminated by reasonable accommoda-
tion."). See also 29 C.F.R. 1630.15(b)(2).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4); see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.15(b)(1).
37. See supra note 36.
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b. Sample Impermissible Questions:
How many days were you absent from work because of illness
last year?
Have you had a major illness in the last 5 years?
Is there any health-related reason you may not be able to per-
form the job for which you are applying?
Have you ever been treated for any mental condition?
Have you ever been treated by a psychiatrist or psychologist? If
so, for what condition?
Have you ever been hospitalized? If so, for what condition?
Please list any conditions or diseases for which you have been
treated in the past 3 years.
Have you ever had or been treated for any of the following con-
ditions or diseases?
(Followed by a checklist of various conditions and diseases.)
While it is possible to ask about convictions for a crime as a way
of ferreting out information about possible drug addiction, if the
applicant ultimately selected is less qualified than the rejected ap-
plicant with a conviction, under both New York State and New
York City law such inquiries subject the employer to liability for
discrimination on the basis of arrest or conviction record.38
38. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753 (McKinney 1998). Article 23-A of the New
York Correction Law, entitled "Licensure and Employment of Persons Previously
Convicted of One or More Criminal Offenses," was enacted to address discrimination
against former inmates. Section 753 of the New York Correction Law lists specific
factors relevant to the extension of an offer of employment to an ex-offender as
follows:
1. In making a determination pursuant to section seven hundred fifty-two of
this chapter, the public agency or private employer shall consider the follow-
ing factors:
(a) The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to encourage
the licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or
more criminal offenses.
(b) The specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the li-
cense or employment sought.
(c) The bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which the per-
son was previously convicted will have on his fitness or ability to perform
one or more such duties or responsibilities.
(d) The time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal of-
fense or offenses.
(e) The age of the person at the time of occurrence of the criminal of-
fense or offenses.
(f) The seriousness of the offense or offenses.
(g) Any information produced by the person, or produced on his behalf,
in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct.
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3. Reasonable Accommodation
Compliance with the requirements of the pre-employment pro-
cess, as seen above, are not the only challenge for employers.
Many employees will become disabled during the course of their
careers, and many will not be prepared to retire as a result. Under
the ADA, those disabilities that are held to be substantially life-
impairing require reasonable accommodation,39 even if they are
not directly job-related.4 ° For instance, a request from a desk-
bound employee with whiplash following an automobile accident
may be entitled to an ergonomic chair to ease pressure on the in-
jured back, unless the employer can establish undue hardship.41
This is so, notwithstanding that while an ergonomic chair may
make doing desk work easier for everyone because it supports the
back in an upright posture, it is not necessary for all employees to
maintain an upright posture to do their deskwork comfortably.
This kind of indirect, job-related need for accommodation is distin-
guishable from a direct, job-related need for accommodation, such
as the use of telecommunication devices for the deaf that make it
possible for people with hearing and/or speech impairments to
communicate over the telephone.
(h) The legitimate interest of the public agency or private employer in
protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or
the general public.
2. In making a determination pursuant to section seven hundred fifty-two of
this chapter, the public agency or private employer shall also give considera-
tion to a certificate of relief from disabilities or a certificate of good conduct
issued to the applicant, which certificate shall create a presumption of reha-
bilitation in regard to the offense or offenses specified therein.
Id. The state Human Rights Law, which governs the administration of the New York
State Division of Human Rights, provides that the agency is obliged to investigate
complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of arrest or conviction record. See
N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 296(16) (McKinney 1998). The relevant section of the New York
City Human Rights Law is section 8-107.11 of the Administrative Code of the City of
New York, and it protects ex-offenders against discrimination with respect to the ac-
quisition of a license, employment, or the provision of credit. See N.Y.C. ADMIN.
CODE § 8-107.11 (1996).
39. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1) (defining reasonable accommodation as modifica-
tions or adjustments to a job application process or work environment as to allow a
disabled applicant to be considered for a position or an employee to perform the
essential duties of the position).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (requiring reasonable accommodation without
conditioning the requirement on whether the disability was job-related).
41. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (excepting from the requirement to make a reason-
able accommodation when such accommodation will "impose an undue hardship" on
the employer).
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The EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual4 2 makes it clear that if
more than one accommodation would be effective for the individ-
ual with a disability, or if the individual would prefer to provide his
or her own accommodation, the individual's preference should be
given first consideration.43 While employers may choose the ac-
commodations that are less expensive or easier to provide, they
should be aware that their right to choose is no guarantee that em-
ployees will not turn around and allege discrimination on the basis
of inadequate accommodation.
4. Undue Hardship
While the ADA provides that an employer is not required to
make a reasonable accommodation if it would impose an "undue
hardship '44 on the operation of the business, the employer is not
likely to prevail unless the accommodation requested would im-
pose a "significant difficulty or expense. 45
In reviewing the factors the EEOC will consider in determining
whether an accommodation imposes an undue hardship on an em-
ployer, it is clear that in the event of a suit over failure to provide a
requested accommodation, the EEOC will exercise its prerogative
to review the company's business, financial, and other operations
to evaluate whether the hardship alleged by the employer is actu-
ally "undue. '46 Some of the factors which the EEOC will consider
are:
1) The nature and net cost of the accommodation needed, after
tax credits and deductions for making accommodations are bal-
anced against the actual cost of the actual accommodation;
2) The financial resources of the facility making the accommo-
dation, the number of employees at this facility, and the effect
on expenses and resources of the facility;
3) The overall financial resources, size, number of employees,
and type and location of facilities of the entity covered by the
ADA;
4) The type of operation of the covered entity, including the
structure and functions of the workforce, the geographic sepa-
rateness, and the administrative or fiscal relationship of the fa-
42. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 6, at 111-8 to 10.
43. See id.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
45. Id.
46. See TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 6, at 111-8 to 10.
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cility involved in making the accommodation to the larger
entity;
5) The impact of the accommodation on the operation of the
facility that is making the accommodation.47
5. The Impact of the Accommodation on Operations
There are, however, some undue hardship claims that the em-
ployer may not present. First, an employer may not claim undue
hardship solely because providing an accommodation has a nega-
tive impact on the morale of other employees.48 Secondly, an em-
ployer claim may not present a claim of undue hardship because of
"disruption" due to employee fears about, or prejudices toward, a
person's disability. 49
These exclusions from the definition of "undue hardship" are the
soft underbelly of the ADA. Furthermore, these exclusions are ar-
eas where employers have the most to worry about, particularly
those companies that require employees to work in environments
where employees must work in close contact with each other, such
as financial trading desks and assembly lines. While an employer
may not be able to avoid a reasonable accommodation due to em-
ployee fears about a co-worker's disability, employee fears cannot
be wished away: they will have an effect on workplace morale.
Employees will freely speculate about the severity of the disability
underpinning an obvious accommodation. Some employees will
suspect that it was manufactured to justify special treatment.
Other employees will overstate the severity of the disability or ill-
ness, spreading fear in the workplace. Others will have no idea as
to the existence or lack of a disability, but will be persuaded that
special treatment is being provided for unknown reasons.
In addition to employee morale issues, these exclusions will pose
other management challenges. For example, employees may have
irrational responses to disfigurements that they may believe repre-
sent a health risk. Consequently, the employer is vulnerable to
suits from both sides: from the non-accommodated or inadequately
accommodated employee on one side, and from employees who
perceive themselves to be exposed to unnecessary health or safety
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Nevertheless, separating myth from reality while preserving an
employee's confidentiality is essential if an employer is to develop
a rational and legally sustainable approach to addressing disability
issues in a particular workplace. In light of an employer's OSHA
obligation to provide a workplace safe from foreseeable health and
safety risk,50 the ADA forbids employers from claiming undue
hardship in anticipation of low employee morale or prejudices
about a particular disability. In order to meet both OSHA and
ADA standards, employers must be prepared to respond to un-
founded employee fears about a coworker with a disability by ex-
plaining that anything less than a workplace free from foreseeable
health and safety risks is a source of liability for the employer.
6. Retracting the Broadening Reach of the ADA:
Sutton v. United Airlines
The only brake on the ever-widening reach of the ADA has been
the Supreme Court's 7-2 decision in Sutton v. United Airlines,51
which stated that a person with a correctable impairment is not
disabled for purposes of the ADA if as a result of the correction,
the impairment does not substantially limit a major life activity.5 2
The plaintiffs, myopic twin sisters, applied to United Airlines for
employment as commercial airline pilots but were rejected because
they did not meet United's minimum requirement of uncorrected
vision of 20/100 or better without corrective lenses. 3 They filed
suit alleging that they were being discriminated on the basis of a
disability covered by the ADA.54 The Court rejected plaintiff's as-
sertion that they were part of the protected class embraced by the
ADA and found in favor of United Airlines.5 5
The Court excluded the plaintiffs from the protected class by
pronouncing that the language of the ADA, read in its plainest
sense, focuses on the degree of limitation of a major life activity
presently, not previously, experienced by the plaintiff and the limi-
tations the complainant continues to face despite corrective meas-
ures.5 6 By focusing on the degree of life-impairment, the Supreme
Court took a practical approach to the question of who is covered
by the ADA and stated that "[t]hat use or nonuse of a corrective
50. See discussion infra Part I.B.
51. 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
52. See id. at 2149.
53. See id. at 2141.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 2146.
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device does not determine whether an individual is disabled; that
determination depends on whether the limitations an individual
with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limit-
ing."'57 Thus, as the Court pointed out in response to Judge Ste-
vens' dissent, someone with a prosthetic device will be covered
under the ADA because even with the prosthetic, the complainant
is substantially limited in life activities.58
Attorneys for plaintiffs, however, had a second argument (to
make) based on the "perceived to be disabled" prong of the ADA
definition of disability.59 This argument advanced the idea that
someone may be discriminated against because they are mistakenly
regarded as substantially limited by an impairment, in this case the
need for corrective lenses.60 The Sutton complainants argued that
United Airlines stereotyped applicants with correctable vision im-
pairments by excluding them from consideration for positions as
pilots.61 The Court rejected this argument by pointing out that
although United's "no glasses or contact lenses" policy barred
them from being hired as pilots for United Airlines, they could
work for other airlines because United's policy was not industry-
wide.62
The Court rejected the complainant's concern about other air-
lines adopting United's policy by characterizing United's decision
as the exercise of a preference, not the practice of discriminatory
exclusion. 63 Justice Stevens' dissent, however, supported the plain-
tiff's argument.64 Had Stevens' opinion been adopted by the ma-
jority of the court, it would have further undermined the
employer's right to exercise a preference. The following paragraph
taken from the dissent illustrates this point:
Indeed, it seems to me eminently within the purpose and policy
of the ADA to require employers who make hiring and firing
decisions based on individuals' uncorrected vision to clarify why
having, for example, 20/100 uncorrected vision or better is a
valid job requirement. So long as an employer explicitly makes
its decision based on an impairment that in some condition is
substantially limiting, it matters not under the structure of the
57. Sutton v. United Airlines, 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (1999) (emphasis omitted).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 2143.
60. See id. at 2144.
61. See id. at 2143.
62. See id. at 2152.
63. See id. at 2150.
64. See id. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Act whether that impairment is widely shared or so rare that it
is seriously misunderstood. Either way, the individual has an
impairment that is covered by the purpose of the ADA, and she
should be protected against irrational stereotypes and unjusti-
fied disparate treatment on that basis.65
7. Exercise of a Preference or Discriminatory Exclusion?
One particularly interesting point in Sutton is the Court's rejec-
tion of the complainant's concern about the implications of having
all employers of airline pilots adopt a policy excluding applicants
using corrective lenses. Plaintiffs argued that if the court ruled
against them, commercial airlines would freely reject applicants
wearing corrective lenses. Thus, the "perceived to be" prong of the
disability definition would be violated by the perpetuation of
stereotypes.66
By rejecting this argument,67 the Court accorded employers a
new freedom to determine the physical prerequisites of a position,
without fear of being sued by a rejected applicant whose physical
impairment had affected the hiring decision. Implicitly, this deci-
sion also confers on the employer the right to exclude a qualified
applicant with a correctable disability. The result is that the "per-
ceived to be" prong of the ADA's definition of disability is inacces-
sible to plaintiffs with substantially correctable impairments.
Extrapolating from the Court's reasoning, in order for this class
of excluded plaintiffs to receive protection under this prong of the
ADA, they would have to demonstrate that: 1) there is an industry-
wide policy of discriminating against them; 2) it stereotypes them;
and 3) it substantially limits them in working. In Sutton, the com-
plainants were unable to meet this threshold because the Court did
not accept their categorization of "global airline pilot"68 as a posi-
tion they were substantially impaired in performing. The Court in-
dicated complainants could be employed as flight instructors or
regional pilots, and quoted the EEOC's Interpretative Guidance in
support of its position that "an individual who cannot be a com-
mercial airline pilot because of a minor vision impairment, but who
can be a commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot for a courier service,
65. Id. at 2158. Justice Breyer's dissent also questioned the Court's wisdom in not
giving deference to the EEOC's regulation-writing authority with respect to the
ADA's definition of disability. See id. at 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 2143.
67. See id. at 2152.
68. See id. at 2151.
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would not be substantially limited in the major life activity of
working. "69
Citing the EEOC, this Court had no qualms about keeping a
"dream job" out of the reach of an applicant with a correctable
disability provided there was alternative employment.7 ° The Court
was clearly more concerned about the potential increase in litiga-
tion if the ADA definition of "disability" were found to include
correctable conditions, than with the perpetuation of stereotypes.
Even with the exclusion of individuals with substantially correct-
able disabilities, the ADA nevertheless presents serious challenges
for employers. While other anti-discrimination laws have changed
the composition of the workforce, but not the nature of the job,
under the disability laws, employers can be compelled to substan-
tially change the nature of the jobs performed by particular em-




It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this
chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards,
tests or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or
otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability
has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by rea-
sonable accommodation, as required under this subchapter.71
Unlike the burden of production and persuasion of identifying a
reasonable accommodation that lies with the plaintiff,72 the defend-
ant employer bears the burden of demonstrating a business neces-
sity to justify excluding a disabled employee.73 In order for the
employer to use the business necessity defense, the employer must
first demonstrate that all alternatives presented by the plaintiff
would pose an undue hardship to the employer. 74 Alternatively,
69. Id. (quoting section 1630.2 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
70. See COPLAND (Buena Vista 1997) (depicting Sylvester Stallone as a small-town
cop whose punctured eardrum keeps him out of consideration for his "dream" job
with the New York City Police Department).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (1994).
72. See Stewart v. Happy Herman's Chesire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th
Cir. 1997).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113.
74. See Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763, 780 (E.D. Tex.
1996).
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the employer may show that even with accommodation, the em-
ployee remains unable to fulfill the essential functions of the job.
Dey v. Milwaukee Forge75 illustrates an employer's burden in a
reasonable accommodation claim. In Dey, the worker did not re-
ceive his proposed accommodations after back surgery leaving him
with an extremely limited range of motion. The worker was a dye
polisher on the first shift, a position requiring heavy lifting and sub-
stantial bending.76 Dey filled the position for almost four years
before he was injured in March, 1991. He returned to work part-
time on a light duty assignment on March 30, 1992. A September,
1992 Rehabilitation Work Capacity Evaluation of Dey performed
by an independent party reported to Dey's doctor and Dey's em-
ployer that Dey could stoop, squat, climb stairs, lift and carry, but
on a restricted basis.77
A month later his physician informed Dey and his employer that
Dey could not bend in accordance with the physical requirements
of the dye polisher position, even with modifications. 78 A subse-
quent report by an independent physician, dated November 19,
1992, concluded that Dey could return to work with a permanent
50 pound weight lifting restriction, provided he avoided repetitive
bending or lifting.79 A December report from Dey's physician am-
plified the previous reports and indicated that Dey would be per-
manently unable to do any lifting that required continued
maintenance of even a mildly flexed posture; he was also not to
repetitively bend or lift more than thirty pounds.8" Dey's employer
reviewed Dey's records to determine whether there were any avail-
able jobs that Dey could perform within these restrictions. Be-
cause Dey had held a machine-hand position in 1988 for a brief
time, Dey's employer offered that position to Dey. Even though
some bending was involved, it was much less than that required in
the dye polisher position.81
After a brief trial period, Dey indicated he could not use the
machines without additional accommodation in the form of an ad-
justable stool. Dey's supervisor was sympathetic, but suggested
that if Dey stooped, squatted and set machine dials to avoid bend-
75. 957 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Wis. 1996).





81. See id. at 1048.
1276
2000] RISK REDUCTION IN OFFICE WORKPLACE 1277
ing, he could avoid the repetitive bending that irritated his back.82
Even with this accommodation, however, Dey still had to bend
periodically.
Presented with Dey's requirements, Dey's supervisor temporar-
ily assigned very light duties to Dey. On February, 1993, the com-
pany's president informed Dey that there was no more light duty
available and that Dey would have a week to decide whether he
would work in the machine-hand position offered him.83 The com-
pany made the ultimatum based on the independent doctor's re-
port that Dey should be able to perform the duties of the machine
hand position provided he stooped and squatted as an alternative
to bending. By Dey's own admission, without using this alternative
approach, even with the accommodation of an adjustable stool, he
was capable of performing only fifty to sixty percent of tasks the
machine-hand position required. He conceded, too, that the tem-
porary work assignments meted out by his supervisor were "just
'make work."' 84 A week after the company made the ultimatum,
Dey responded by saying he would work only within his doctor's
restrictions. The company informed Dey that it had no work
within those parameters and the plaintiff commenced suit against
the company. 5
From December 1992 to February 12, 1993, prior to instituting
his suit, Dey suggested to management that he should be consid-
ered for a foreman's position, a promotion to a supervisory posi-
tion that he was not qualified for.86 He also asked to be considered
for a timekeeper position. Neither a foreman nor a timekeeper
position was available at the time Dey made his suggestions, nor
were they to be imminently available. 7 Dey also thought that he
might be considered for a clerical position, but never broached the
idea with management to verify whether any such positions were
available. The court found for the employer, stating very clearly
what an employer is or is not obligated to do to accommodate an
employee under the ADA:
The ADA requires an employer to make whatever accommoda-
tions are reasonably possible in circumstances so as to allow the
employee to perform the functions essential to his position.
82. See id.




87. See id. at 1050.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
However, the ADA does not obligate an employer to provide a
disabled employee every accommodation on his wish list.
The ADA may require an employer to reassign a disabled em-
ployee to a different position as a reasonable accommodation
where the employee can no longer perform the essential func-
tions of their current position. However ... there are 'significant
limitations on an employer's potential obligation to reassign a
disabled employee as a reasonable accommodation. An em-
ployer is not obligated to provide an employee the accommoda-
tion he requests or prefers; the employer need only provide
some reasonable accommodation. Nor is an employer obligated
to "bump" other employees to create a vacancy for the disabled
employee or to create a "new" position for the disabled
employee.88
Dey's requests for accommodation to perform the machine-hand
job included asking for occasional assistance of other machine
hand workers in performing his machine-hand job.89 He did not
establish that he could perform the job with the help of other
machine-hand workers. He also did not provide evidence that such
intervention would be at most minimally disruptive to the produc-
tivity of other machine-hand workers. Citing Gilbert v. Frank,90
the court pointed out that reallocating job duties in order to ac-
commodate the requests of a disabled employee is not mandated
by the ADA.91 Further, if a reduction in productivity of the opera-
tions would be a result of reallocating job duties, such an accom-
modation would be unreasonable, because it posed an undue
hardship on the employer. Thus, if after a sustained period of eval-
uation and attempts at accommodation, Dey could not perform the
functions of his original position, and could not perform the func-
tions of the available alternative job offered to him, the employer
would not be required to do more. 92
To prevail against a claim that a disabled employee was not rea-
sonably accommodated under the ADA, an employer must: 1) seri-
ously evaluate the request for accommodation; 2) evaluate whether
modification of the employee's duties or reassignment to other du-
ties that do not implicate the employee's physical limitations is pos-
sible; 3) evaluate the employee's request against the exact nature
of the medically documented disability, balancing the limitations
88. Id. at 1050-51 (citations omitted).
89. See id. at 1052.
90. 949 F.2d 637 (2nd Cir. 1991).
91. See Dey, 957 F. Supp. at 1052.
92. See id. at 1054.
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mandated by the employee's physician against the percentage of
actual tasks inherent in the employee's present job that implicate
the disability; 4) evaluate whether the reassignment will disrupt
productivity or result in unfairness to other employees; and 5) pro-
duce a record that upon receiving the employee's request, the em-
ployer has both evaluated the employee's doctor recommendations
and workplace, for the purpose of determining whether accommo-
dation is reasonable.
B. Integrating OSHA into the ADA Framework
Employers of New York City businesses are aware that the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act impose a general duty to "fur-
nish to each of [their] employees employment and a place of
employment which [is] free from recognized hazards that are caus-
ing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to [their]
employees. '93 Particularly in larger companies, employers seek to
define their obligations to employees with viruses such as HIV or
Hepatitis C, and their obligations to the other members of their
staff who come into contact with such employees.
It is not uncommon for a large company to have several employ-
ees who are infected with either HIV or Hepatitis C.94 These vi-
ruses are not eradicated by antibiotic pharmaceuticals, which have
worked so well against bacterial infections.95 A majority of such
employees will want to remain in the workforce. Under OSHA
and the ADA, how should an employer balance the competing in-
terests of infected employees and healthy employees?
1. OHSA Analysis
The OSHA standards can be broken down into five parts: (1)
"freedom from"; (2) "recognized"; (3) "hazards"; (4) that "cause
93. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982).
94. Katherine E. Finkelstein, Medical Workers Nervous Over Spread of Hepatitis
C, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1999, at 2.
95. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999: MAK-
ING A DIFFERENCE 1, 22 (1999) (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://www.who.org/whr/1999/
en/report.htm> ("Increases in international air travel, trade... and tourism mean that
disease-producing organisms, the deadly as well as the commonplace, can be trans-
ported rapidly from one continent to another."). See also Dennis Pirages, Ecological
Theory and International Relations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 53, 61 (1997)
("Large scale movements of people ... internationally place more human beings in
contact with each other and accelerate the spread of communicable disease.").
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or are likely to cause"; (5) "death or serious physical harm."96 Of
course, employees such as restaurant workers, sanitation, hazard-
ous waste disposal and sewage treatment workers, police, fire and
other rescue workers, health care personnel and morticians by the
very nature of their work are exposed to the risk of infection.
OSHA has specified that protective equipment is a must in such
environments,97 and a substantial literature has developed regard-
ing that topic.98 Hence, the question of an employer's duty when
the risk is inherent in the workplace and recognized is largely set-
tled. Instead, the challenge to employers is how to respond to the
safety and health challenges resulting from the presence of an in-
fected individual in the workplace. 99
This challenge is amply exemplified in infectious diseases such as
HIV, Hepatitis C, and tuberculosis. While it is not in dispute that
96. Debra A Abbott, Comment, Symposium on AIDS and the Rights and Obliga-
tions of Health Care Workers: Workplace Exposure to AIDS, 48 MD. L. REV. 212, 214
(1989).
97. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132-1910.139 (1999).
98. See Arthur J. Marinelli, Worker Protection and the Law of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1053 (1987); Salwa G. Spong, AIDS
and the Health Care Provider: Burgeoning Legal Issues, 67 MICH. B.J. 610 (1988);
McDonald, Bruce A. Ethical Problems for Physicians Raised by AIDS and HIV Infec-
tion: Conflicting Legal Obligations of Confidentiality and Disclosure, 22 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 557 (1989); Feitshans, Ilise L. Confronting AIDS in the Workplace: Balancing
Employment Opportunity and Occupational Health Under Existing Labor Laws 1989
DET. C.L. REV. 953 (1989).
99. Employees may be aware they are ill, but not aware of the extent of their
illness. HIV, because it suppresses the immune system, can give rise to a range of
coexisting opportunistic infections whose diagnoses are not coincident with the HIV
diagnosis. See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Mycobacterium
Tuberculosis in Health Care Facilities, 1994, 43 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Re-
port 25 (1994) [hereinafter Guidelines].
TB may be more difficult to diagnose among persons who have HIV infec-
tion (or other conditions associated with severe suppression of cell-mediated
immunity) because of a non-classical clinical or radiographic presentation
and/or the simultaneous occurrence of other pulmonary infections (e.g., P.
carinii pneumonia and M. avium complex). The difficulty in diagnosing TB
in HIV-infected persons may be further compounded by impaired responses
to PPD skin tests, the possibly lower sensitivity of sputum smears for de-
tecting AFB, or the overgrowth of cultures with M. avium complex in speci-
mens from patients infected with both M. avium complex and M,
tuberculosis.
Immunosuprressed patients who have pulmonary signs or symptoms that are
ascribed initially to infections or doncitions other than TB should be evalu-
ated initially for coexisting TB. The evaluation for TB should be repeated if
the patient does not respond to appropriate therapy for the presumed
cause(s) of the pulmonary abnormalities.
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HIV or Hepatitis C infection will shorten the life-span of the in-
fected individual, the proposition that this occurs through social
contact is a myth, albeit one with great currency. Employers may
also need to be concerned about tuberculosis when it is airborne.100
Tuberculosis may be transmitted by long-term exposure to persons
infected with active tuberculosis.101 New strains can be resistant to
currently available treatments, if incorrectly administered, or ad-
100. See id. at 4. Further,
M[ycobacterium] tuberculosis is carried in airborne particles, or droplet nu-
clei, that can be generated when persons who have pulmonary or laryngeal
TB sneeze, cough, speak, or sing. The particles are an estimated 1-5pm in
size, and normal air currents can keep them airborne for prolonged time
periods and spread them throughout a room or building. Infection occurs
when a susceptible person inhales droplet much containing M. tuberculosis,
and these droplet nuclei traverse the mouth or nasal passages, upper respira-
tory tract, and bronchi to reach the alveoli of the lungs. Once in the alveoli,
the organisms are taken up by alveolar macrophages and spread throughout
the body. Usually within 2-10 weeks after initial infection with M. tuberculo-
sis, the immune response limits further multiplication and spread of the tu-
bercle bacilli; however, some of the bacilli remain dormant and viable for
many years. This condition is referred to as latent TB infection. Persons
with latent TB infection usually have positive purified protein derivative
(PPD)-tuberculin skin-test results, but they do not have symptoms of active
TB, and they are not infectious.
Id. at 58.
101. See id. at 4-5.
In general, patients who have suspected or confirmed active TB should be
considered infectious if they a) are coughing, b) are undergoing cough-in-
ducing procedures, or c) have positive AFB sputum smears, and if they a)
are not on chemotherapy, b) have just started chemotherapy, or c) have a
poor clinical or bacteriologic response to chemotherapy. A patient who has
drug-susceptible TB and who is on adequate chemotherapy and has had a
significant clinical and bacteriologic response to therapy (i.e., reduction in
cough, resolution of fever, and progressively decreasing quantity of bacilii on
smear) is probably no longer infectious. However, because drug susceptibil-
ity results are not usually known when the decision to discontinue isolation
is made, all TB patients should remain in isolation while hospitalized until
they have had three consecutive negative sputum smears collected on differ-
ent days and they demonstrate clinical improvement.
Id. As a result,
persons who become infected with M. tuberculosis have approximately a
10% risk for developing active TB during their lifetimes. This risk is greatest
during the first 2 years after infection. Immunocompromised persons have a
greater risk for the progression of latent TB infection to active TB disease;
HIV infection is the strongest known risk factor for this progression. Per-
sons with latent TB infection who become coinfected with HIV have approx-
imately an 8%-10% risk per year for developing active TB. HIV-infected
persons who are already severely immunosuppressed and who become
newly infected with M. tuberculosis have an even greater risk for developing
active TB.
Id. at 58.
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ministered when the disease is advanced. 112 Notwithstanding that
knowledge of the causes and the effective treatments for all three
conditions are disparate, all are conditions that in their early stages
do not impede the infected individual from working,'0 3 but which
arouse paranoia in the workplace, both on the part of the infected
and those who come in contact with the infected and are aware of
the condition. Employers, whose workplace does not inherently
pose a risk of infection transmission, may be unclear as to the best
approach to take when presented with the competing challenges of
an employee requesting protection of his confidentiality under the
disability laws along with an accommodation, and the potential
that providing the accommodation may create suspicion and hostil-
ity in healthy co-workers.
If, in the employer's view, it would be better to disclose the in-
fected employee's condition to a select group of supervisors and
employees, may the employer do so without risking suit for breach
of the infected employee's right of confidentiality under the ADA?
Whether or not the employer determines that some disclosure of
the employee's condition is advisable, may the employer discipline
the "refuse-nik" employee who balks at working with a perceived-
to-be infected employee?' 0 4
102. See Richard L. Riley and Edward A. Nardell, Controlling Transmission of Tu-
berculosis in Health Care Facilities: Ventilation, Filtration, and Ultraviolet Air Disin-
fection, in 1993 PLANT TECHNOLOGY & SAFETY MANAGEMENT SERIES 25.
The interruption of person-to-person transmission of pulmonary tuberculosis
(TB) is particularly difficult because the infecting particles are airborne and
a single TB-containing particle, strategically deposited in the lung, is enough
to infect...
The source of tubercle bacilli that transmit tuberculosis is the lung of an
infected person ... A person breathes about 0.353 cubic feet of air per min-
ute or about 500 cubic feet per day, yet it ordinarily takes months or even
years of association with tuberculosis patients before infection occurs ...
Because of the huge cumulative columns of air that people breathe over
time, such a dilute suspension of tubercle bacilli in the air was found ade-
quate, by calculation, to account for the rate of infection of student nurses
working on tuberculosis wards. On average, it took about a year. When
patients produce larger numbers of airborne organisms or dilution by room
ventilation is less, organisms may be less widely separated and infection may
occur more rapidly. Nevertheless, the fact that airborne tubercle bacilli oc-
cur sporadically, together with the fact that a single one when deposited in
the lung can cause infection, makes transmission of tuberculosis difficult to
control.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
103. See School Bd. v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (discussing tuberculosis).
104. Query: "What if an employer decides not to disclose information about an
infected employee and an employee refuses to work with the infected employee that
he correctly perceives to be infected?" Answer: Whether the employer discloses or
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2. Public Health Overlap
With respect to tuberculosis, employers in New York City need
to know that under the City's Health Code, physicians with a pa-
tient testing positive for active tuberculosis bacilii are required to
report that fact to the New York City Department of Health (the
"Health Department"), which will then track down the patient's
employer. 10 5 Once identified as a person with infectious, active tu-
berculosis, the Commissioner of the Health Department will issue
an exclusion order that may exclude the person from the work-
place, school, and "any premises or facilities the [Health] Depart-
ment determines cannot be maintained in a manner adequate to
protect others against spread of the disease."106
In this situation, the Health Department's authority supersedes
both the employer's authority and that of the ADA. 10 7 Notwith-
standing, an individual may be infected with active tuberculosis for
some time before visiting a physician to confirm the diagnosis.108
Indeed, according to a combined American-Australian study, 0 9
delayed diagnosis increases the risk that co-workers will be in-
fected at a higher than normal rate.'10 A study by the United
does not disclose the infected employee's status, the answer is the same: whether the
refusal is based on fact or fancy, the query goes to factual question of whether the
employer has provided against recognized workplace hazards adequately. If he has,
the employee is without cause to refuse to work as he did prior to the advent of the
employer's knowledge of the infected employee's condition.
105. See N.Y.C. HEALTH CODE art. 11, § 47 (1999).
Tuberculosis; reporting, examination, exclusion, removal and detention. (a) A
physician who attends a case of active tuberculosis, or the person I charge of
a hospital, dispensary or clinic giving out-patient treatment to such a case,
shall report to the Department at such times that the Department requires.
The report shall state whether the case is still under treatment, the address
of the case, the stage, clinical status and treatment of the disease and the
dates and results of sputum and X-ray examinations and any other informa-
tion required by the Department. The physician who attends the case or the
person in charge of a hospital, dispensary or clinic giving out-patient care to
such a case shall report promptly to the Department when the case ceases to
receive treatment and the reason for the cessation of treatment.
Id.
106. See id. at 47(d).
107. City of New York v. Antoinette R., 630 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1995); City of New
York v. Doe, 614 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1994).
108. See Guidelines, supra note 99, at 25.
109. See C. Raina Maclntyre et al., High Rate of Transmission of Tuberculosis in an
Office: Impact of Delayed Diagnosis, 21 CLINICAL INFECTIOUs DISEASES 1170 (1995).
110. See id. In 1993, a Melbourne, Australia office notified the State Health De-
partment of Victoria in Victoria, Australia, that two of its employees had pulmonary
TB. See id. at 1170. One of the infected individuals had "a productive cough and
night sweats and noted weight loss since the end of September 1992," for which she
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States Navy indicated that individuals with no direct contact with
an infected individual may be infected by inhalation of airborne
droplets carrying the tuberculosis bacilii that are "rapidly and
evenly dispersed throughout a closed environment with a recircula-
tion ventilation system."11'
While an employer cannot be held liable for unforeseeable
hazards in the workplace, recent increases in the incidence of tu-
berculosis'1 2 do raise troubling issues for employers, caught be-
tween the concern about being sued for having been insufficiently
alert to the hazard of an infected individual in the workplace, and
the obligation to protect an infected employee from discrimination.
3. Employer's Duties
The simplest situation for the employer is when the employer is
faced with an obviously ill employee with symptoms of an underly-
ing infection, such as fever. In this situation, the employer should
always send the employee home without delay - albeit without
making conclusions about the causes of his particular symptoms.
An employee who has the outward symptoms of an infection
should not return to work until the employee's physician has certi-
fied that employee's fitness to return to work. Due to the em-
had seen a doctor who had not tested her for tuberculosis initially. See id. The other
infected individual, who was found to have pulmonary TB, was employed at the same
office as the first individual but had transferred to another state. See id. at 1171. The
second individual did not work closely with the first individual. See id. The office,
which is in a western suburb of Melbourne, has 150 people that work on site and 60
that work at other areas yet come to the office once a week. See id. "The majority of
on site employees (85 of 150) are customer service representatives who work in a
large, unpartitioned office area and answer telephone calls from customers." Id. The
study found that 24% of the employees (46 people) were infected with tuberculosis,
albeit in an inactive form. See id. at 1172.
111. V.N. Houk et al., The Epidemiology of Tuberculosis Infection in a Closed En-
vironment, 16 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH 26, 34 (1968).
112. See Current Epidemiology of Tuberculosis in the United States, Control of Tu-
berculosis in the United States, 146 AM. REV. OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE 1623 (1992).
In fact,
[i]n 1991, the number of reported cases of TB in the United States was 26,
283 - an increase of two percent compared with the previous year.
Although there had been an annual decline of approximately five percent in
the number of TB cases since the 1950s and six to seven percent annual
decline in cases during the years 1981 to 1984, in 1985 to 1991 the number of
cases increased by 18%. Using the trend for 1981 to 1984 to estimate the
expected number of cases for 1985 to 1991, it can be calculated that more
than 39,000 excess cases of TB occurred between 1985 and 1991 (figure 1).
The occurrence of TB among persons with HIV infection is a major factor
contributing to this change in the decades-long pattern of decline of TB.
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ployer's lack of knowledge as to the causes of the employee's
symptoms, an employer should keep an obviously ill employee out
of the workplace." 3
This situation, however, is not identical to the circumstance
where an employee with a non-obvious disability approaches an
employer for an accommodation. To avoid liability for discrimina-
tion on the basis of a disability and breach of an employee's confi-
dentiality, employers who suspect that an employee is infected with
a life-threatening disease may not make inquiries to determine the
existence of any disability,1 4 even one that poses a public health
risk to others, such as tuberculosis. In the case of an employee
infected with HIV who approaches the employer with a request for
an accommodation, the employer must preserve the confidentiality
of the employee's disclosure. 15
The same is true for an employee with AIDS requesting an ac-
commodation in a workplace in which there is no inherent risk of
transmission of blood or other bodily fluids. Absent proof that the
employee's continued employment poses "a direct threat to the
health and safety of other individuals in the workplace," ' 1 6 the em-
ployer may not discharge or transfer the employee. The case of
Estate of William C. Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center'17 illustrates
the level of risk an employee must pose to others before the direct
threat threshold is met.
4. Mauro
Borgess Medical Center, a Michigan hospital, employed Mauro
from May 1990 through August, 1992 as an operating room techni-
cian. 118 In June 1992, the employer learned that Mauro had
AIDS.11 9 Because of concern that Mauro might expose a patient to
HIV, the employer created a new full-time position that eliminated
all risks of transmission of the HIV virus for Mauro. 120 Mauro re-
113. An employee and his doctor may be initially aware that the employee is ill, but
not of the extent of the illness. The case of HIV makes possible coexisting opportu-
nistic infections is a case in point. See Guidelines, supra note 85 and text within the
footnote.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1999).
115. See id.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). The Rehabilitation Act applies in addition to the ADA
where the employer is federally-funded in whole or part. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 705, 793-
794 (1999).
117. 137 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998).
118. See id. at 400.
119. See id.
120. See id.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
fused the position offered to him in July 1992.121 Borgess then cre-
ated a task force to determine whether an HIV positive employee
could safely perform the job responsibilities of a technician. 122 The
task force determined that a job requiring an HIV-infected worker
to place his or her hands into a patient's body cavity in the pres-
ence of sharp instrumentation represented a direct threat to patient
safety.123 Subsequently, Borgess discharged Mauro and he sued. 24
Initially, Mauro lost at trial in the federal district court of Michi-
gan.125 On appeal Mauro argued that the district court erred in
concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact about
whether the likelihood of him transmitting HIV in the course of his
job posed a significant risk or direct threat to the health and safety
of others, thus rendering him unqualified under the ADA.126 The
question on appeal was whether the risk was "significant" in line
with the factors laid out in the Airline case, 27 which specified that
a court must consider:
(a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is transmitted);
(b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier
infectious);
(c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third
parties); and
(d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will
cause varying degrees of harm. 128
Equal Employment Opportunity Guidelines cited by the court,
however, indicated that an employer is not permitted to deny an
employment opportunity to an individual with a disability merely
because of a slightly increased risk. 129 The risk can only be consid-
ered when it poses a significant risk, i.e. high probability, of sub-
stantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient. 130 Thus,
the probability of infection is the dispositive factor in the determi-
nation, not the possibility of infection.
In Mauro's situation, the scientific consensus was that following





125. See Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, 886 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Mich. 1995).
126. See Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, 137 F.3d 398, 401 (6th Cir. 1998).
127. See School Bd. v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
128. See id. at 288.
129. See Mauro, 137 F.3d. at 403.
130. See id. at 403; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996) (defining "direct threat").
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cian, he could occasionally be required to supplement the retrac-
tion of muscle tissue effected with a surgical clamp by sticking his
surgically-gloved hand in the wound.13 1 In fact, the record indi-
cated that during surgery on one occasion Mauro had sliced his
right index finger while removing a knife blade from a handle and
on another that he had scratched his hand with the sharp end of a
dirty needle while threading it.132 The medical expert who testified
at the trial agreed with Borgess Medical Center that the theoretical
model used by the Center for Disease Control estimated that the
risk of a patient being infected by an HIV-positive surgeon during
a single operation as being somewhere between one in 42,000 and
one in 420,000.133 The medical expert noted, however, that if a job
required an HIV-infected worker to place his or her hands into a
patient's body cavity with a sharp instrument in the vicinity of the
cavity and the technician's hand, such contact with the body cavity
represented a real risk to patient care and safety which could lead
to the transmission of the AIDS virus. 134
Notwithstanding the medical expert's persuasive testimony as to
the probable risk, the Mauro case did not turn on statistical infor-
mation alone. Rather, it turned on: (1) the analysis of the HIV
Task Force evaluating the problem Mauro's condition represented;
(2) the willingness of Borgess Medical Center to accommodate
Mauro in a reasonable way; and (3) Mauro's refusal to accept the
accommodation. Employers should not read Mauro to support
employers' use of doctors' opinions to justify employment action
against a disabled person. Concerned about an employee with an
infectious disease not covered under the list of diseases justifying
exclusion by the Health Department, employers should be pre-
pared to engage in an Airline analysis, 35 whether the condition is
HIV, AIDS or a common cold.
5. Non-Infectious Disabilities
Turning to employees with non-infectious disabilities, the rule is
that employers may not automatically discharge such employees.
For example, in cases concerning morbid obesity, the futility of us-
ing a physician's opinion to justify discrimination on the basis of
such a non-infectious disability is well-illustrated by EEOC v.
131. See Mauro, 137 F.3d at 404.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 405.
134. See id.
135. See School Bd. v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII
Texas Bus Lines,1 36 EEOC v. Chrysler Corp.1 37 and EEOC v. Ex-
xon Corp. 138
In Texas Bus Lines, the court held that an employer's reliance on
a physician's opinion that under a federal Department of Transpor-
tation regulation an applicant's obesity would disqualify her for a
bus driver's position was improper and erroneous and constituted a
violation by the employer of the Americans with Disabilities
Act. 139 While the relevant DOT regulation instructed the examin-
ing physician to consider the applicant's weight as a factor in as-
sessing the applicant's physical qualifications for the job, the court
ruled that obesity was only to be considered as evidence of disqual-
ifying illnesses and was not a per se disqualification under the
regulation. 140
In the case the EEOC brought against the Chrysler Corpora-
tion 141 the automatic exclusion of a diabetic electrician from cer-
tain types of work without individual analysis of the specific degree
of impairment manifested was a violation of the ADA.
EEOC v. Exxon Corp. is another example of a knee-jerk reac-
tion by an employer which unnecessarily exposed it to liability
under the ADA. 142 In that case, excluded employees challenged
Exxon's policy of automatically excluding current Exxon employ-
ees who are rehabilitated substance abusers from safety sensitive
positions. 43 Citing the ADA's direct threat test,4 Exxon de-
fended by introducing a claim that a blanket policy was required
because individualized assessment was if not, impossible, impracti-
cal due to the highly unpredictable risk of relapse, and the safety
threat presented by a relapsed employee. 45 Ultimately, the court
accepted Exxon's arguments and held that the ADA does not pro-
hibit blanket policies based on safety-related concerns. In order to
qualify as a blanket exclusion under the ADA, the employer must
establish as a matter of fact that it is impossible or impractical to
individually assess each employee affected by the policy.' 46
Whether Exxon could meet that standard was a question of fact
136. 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
137. 917 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
138. 967 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
139. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp at 973.
140. See id. at 972.
141. See EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp.1164 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
142. See Exxon Corp., 967 F. Supp. at 208.
143. See id. at 209.
144. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), 12113(b) (1994).
145. See Exxon Corp., 967 F. Supp. at 211.
146. See id.
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and did not therefore require the court to order summary judg-
ment for Exxon.
In sum, an employer hoping to exclude an applicant or employee
from a particular field of work must be able to demonstrate that
the exclusion is premised on an individual assessment of the safety
risk to others posed by the employee's disability, or that individual
assessment is impractical. An assessment must be well-founded
and may not be premised on speculation. Additionally, the em-
ployer may not hide behind a company's doctor's opinion, but must
analyze the risk posed in light of the Airline factors.147 Otherwise,
the employer should expect to lose if the employee challenges the
limitation in court.
C. The FMLA
Any employer with fifty (50) or more employees for at least
twenty weeks is subject to the FMLA.148 The FMLA requires em-
ployers to permit employees 149 unpaid leave of twelve weeks a year
as maternity leave, to effect an adoption, to care for a close rela-
tive, or on account of a serious health problem.1 50 The employee is
entitled to return to the position he held prior to the leave, or to be
restored to an equivalent position to that he held prior to the
leave. 151 The only exception to this entitlement is a case in which
the employer denied the leave and can prove "such denial is neces-
sary to prevent substantial and grievous economic injury to the op-
erations of the employer," and the employee is so notified prior to
the leave; or, if the leave has already commenced, the employee is
so notified and "elects not to return to employment after receiving
such notice.' 1 52 Such an employee must also be among the ten per-
cent of employees most highly paid.'
15 3
147. See School Bd. v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). See also supra notes 126-127
and accompanying text.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (1994).
149. See id. § 2611(2)(A).
150. See id. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(C).
151. See id. § 2612(D) (stating that leave is permitted "[b]ecause of a serious health
condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of
such employee"). See also id. § 2611(11) (defining "serious health condition" as an
"illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves ... inpatient
care in a hospital, hospice, or residential medical care facility; or ... continuing treat-
ment by a health care provider." Id.
152. Id. § 2614(b)(1)(A).
153. See id. § 2614(b)(B).
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An employer may require advance notice in the case of a fore-
seeable need for leave,'154 as well as certification of the serious
health condition155 and, a second medical opinion as to the exist-
ence of that health condition.156 The FMLA, however, also con-
tains a section prohibiting any interference with the employee's
right to leave and a non-discrimination section' 57 with provision for
lost wages and benefits, with interest, and equitable relief including
employment, promotion and reinstatement. Thus, an employer, in
most cases, must grant a properly certified medical leave and may
not retaliate against an employee who absents himself from the
workplace on medical leave. In the case of highly compensated
employees who wish to sue the employer for denying a leave, the
employer has no safe harbor, and must be prepared to litigate and
prove that the employee's departure from the workplace at the
time of the requested leave would impose "substantial and griev-
ous economic injury' 1 58 to the employer, a very high burden.
II. NEW YORK CITY LAW
Most disability claims filed at the Commission that grow out of
workplace encounters are brought in consequence of the termina-
tion of an employee.' 59 Because the threshold definition of disabil-
ity permits any physical or psychological condition to be the basis
of a complaint, the terminated employee can maintain an action
based on an employer's refusal to accommodate even a minor disa-
bility. It, however, is the obligation of the employee to make the
disability known to the employer, as well as to request the accom-
modation. A former employee making a post-termination disabil-
ity claim cannot prevail unless the existence of the disability and
the request for accommodation were known or should have been
known to the employer prior to the termination.
When a currently disabled employee submits medical documen-
tation of the disability, the employer must attempt to accommo-
date it, regardless of the employer's perception of the severity of
the disability. In such cases, if a complaint is ultimately filed, the
matters are better suited for mediation rather than litigation.
154. See id. § 2612(e)(1).
155. See id. § 2613(b).
156. See id. § 2613(c).
157. See id. § 2615(a).
158. Id. § 2614(b)(1)(A).
159. Of the 135 cases filed in fiscal year 1999 alleging disability-based discrimina-
tion in employment, 61% alleged discharge claims.
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Mediation is a voluntary process. The Commission can compel
neither the employer nor the complainants to participate.
Notwithstanding, the Commission often advises both parties to me-
diate, because it saves time and leads to mutually satisfactory reso-
lution sooner than litigation. In these instances there is little public
interest at stake, and the Commission's litigative resources can be
used in a more constructive manner. If mediation fails, the matter
will return to the docket without prejudice (except in cases where
the complainant refuses to accept a reasonable settlement offer).
1. The Balking Employee
To protect against double litigation, employers confronted with
an employee who balks at working with a co-worker he perceives
to be HIV positive must be aware of the applicable laws prohibit-
ing discrimination against those defined as "disabled," the laws
prohibiting disclosure of confidential information, and the stan-
dards for a safe workplace promulgated by the Occupational
Health and Safety Organization. Disclosure of confidential infor-
mation about a disabled employee can subject the employer to an
ADA discrimination lawsuit based on selective disclosure of confi-
dential information about an employee. Under New York State
law, an employer may communicate the fact of an employee's disa-
bility to a small number of persons without incurring liability for a
breach of confidentiality, provided the disclosure is not casual and
is essential to the provision of an accommodation to the disabled
employee.16°
With regard to the "balking employee," if there is no regular
contact with bodily fluids or risk of such contact, employees have
no right to claim that there is a recognized risk of exposure to
AIDS. The ADA requires that "direct threat" to the health or
safety of others be proved by a showing a "significant risk of sub-
stantial harm." Speculation about the possibility of a freak acci-
dent will not discharge the employee's burden. Therefore, while
AIDS phobia claims generated in the health care context pose
challenges for the management of hospitals and health centers, 161 a
claim by an office worker that the environment poses a "direct
threat" within the meaning of the ADA is unlikely to survive a
summary judgment motion.
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a, at 384 (1977).
161. Leo T. Crowley, AIDS Phobia Claims and the Disabilities Act, N.Y. L.J., Oct.
20, 1994, at 3.
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In sum, in addressing an employee who balks at working with a
co-worker with a non-obvious disability, an employer should never
confirm the existence or non-existence of a disability. In an office
context, refusal to work with a co-worker because of such a percep-
tion should be dealt with according to standard procedures
designed to address an instance of insubordination.
2. Undue Hardship
The defense of "undue hardship" contained in the ADA is of
very limited value to the employer. In the first place, the ADA
provides no safe harbor for employers who believe a requested ac-
commodation poses substantial problems: they can only find out
whether their position is a correct one by being sued by the em-
ployee and learning whether a court agrees with them. This is not
a proactive form of business planning, and most employers will not
avail themselves of it until repeated attempts at accommodation
have failed and the employer has no choice but to defend itself in
the litigation.
It is almost axiomatic that courts do not recognize any employer
claim of "undue hardship" under the ADA, assuming that the em-
ployer, if not bankrupt, is capable of making the accommodation,
whatever the cost. Each workplace is different and each employee
is unique: while two employees may share a disability, each will
certainly have individual characteristics unique to him as a disabled
individual. While the EEOC provides guidelines, there are few
bright line rules, and each employer must be alert to the issues in
order to avoid major pitfalls.' 62
3. New York City Human Rights Law and Sick Leave Policies
Reviewing sick leave policies for non-substantially-limiting im-
pairments should not be a function of the anti-discrimination laws.
Because, however, the definition of "disability" contained in the
City's law includes any physical or psychological condition that can
be verified by a physician, employers, having terminated an em-
ployee for excessive absences, may have to provide a City agency
with sick leave records for conditions which meet the ADA thresh-
old for a disability. In the employment context (versus the public
162. See generally, Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKE-
LEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201 (1993); Lawrence P. Postol & David D. Kadue, An
Employer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act: From Job Qualifications to
Reasonable Accommodations, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 693 (1991).
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accommodations area, where the agency has played a useful role in
expanding accessibility to the disabled) 163 disability cases arising
out of the employment context are all too often unsubstantiated
wrongful termination cases. This will continue to be the case as
long as the definition of "disability" contained in the City's law is
not restricted to seriously impairing conditions as defined by the
ADA.
CONCLUSION
In no other area of anti-discrimination law do the policy conse-
quences of implementing an expanding definition of who is pro-
tected present themselves so starkly. In the area of disability
discrimination, unlike exclusion on the basis of race, religion, na-
tional origin, age or gender, who is a member of the protected class
is subject to contraction and expansion. Contraction because due
to medical breakthroughs, recovery from disabilities that would
have formerly been permanent is possible. Expansion because new
psychological and physical dysfunctions are constantly being identi-
fied and their sources isolated by scientific research. In addition, as
scientific research establishes more and more correlation between
substances ingested and the development of disabling conditions -
or between environmental conditions -the more the taxonomy of
disability will expand. The result of this might be that in the future,
disability law will look very similar to tort law -a jackpot for law-
yers- and less like a social vehicle for doing the right thing by
those born with impairing disabilities.
Employers who want to minimize their litigation risks should: 1)
carefully analyze workplace structures to come up with employer-
oriented job descriptions of the essential functions of a job, relying
163. See Torres v. Prince Management Corp., No. 301/98, 1997 WL 1.051932 (N.Y.C.
Com. Hum. Rts.), Report & Recommendation (August 14, 1997), adopted as modi-
fied, Dec. & Order (October 27, 1997), affd sub nom. Commission on Human Rights
v. 3591-93 Bainbridge Realty, Ltd., Index No. 400356/98 (Sup. Ct., NY County, 1998)
(mother with child in wheelchair denied appropriate access to building whose front
door was at the top of a series of steps); Commission on Human Rights, ex rel. ronnie
Ellen Raymond v. 325 Cooperative, Inc., No. 1423/98, 1999 WL 152526 (N.Y.C. Com.
Hum. Rts.), Report and Recommendation (Jan. 12, 1999), adopted as modified, Dec.
& Order (Jan. 12, 1999) (Woman owner of co-op apartment becomes disabled and
board denies her safe access to building, citing possible suit by first floor apartment
owner whose view would be obstructed by presence of lift at front of building.); New
York City Commission on Human Rights v. Pathmark Stores, Index No. 4011134/99
slip op. (Sup. Ct., NY County 1999) (order enforcing settlement agreement and im-
posing fines; substantial compliance with a conciliation agreement to eliminate super-
market cart corrals insufficient to discharge company's burden of compliance which
must apply to 100% of its New York City supermarkets).
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especially on information from former employees and supervisors
to round out the descriptions with a supervisor's assessment of how
the job fits into the company's big picture; 2) interview applicants
for positions with those descriptions firmly in mind, avoiding im-
permissible inquiries about a possible disability; 3) if an employee
becomes disabled and returns requesting accommodation never
dismiss it out of hand; and 4) if, after serious evaluation, the ac-
commodation requested would require more than the work struc-
ture can comfortably provide, have human resources meet with the
employee to map out the employee's workplan to determine what
alternatives to the original request for accommodation can meet
the employee's need.
Finally, remember that the employee's lack of performance is
never a defense to refusal to entertain or implement a requested
accommodation. If an employee with a disability needs to be ter-
minated, the employer may do so only because the employee can
no longer perform the essential functions of the job. Refusing a
problem employee an accommodation out of spleen only opens the
door to a disability discrimination suit.
Because there is no limitation on what conditions are covered,
under the law of the City of New York, all the above goes is espe-
cially true. Faced with a request for reasonable accommodation, a
New York City employer needs to exercise its right to compel a
medical examination from a physician of its own choosing to verify
the existence of the alleged disability and be ready to litigate if,
after accommodation, the employee is still unable to perform the
essential functions of the job.
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